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Abstract: This paper presents an approach to the formal verication of safety properties of the behaviour-based control
network of the mobile outdoor robot RAVON. In particular, we consider behaviours that are used for the com-
putation of the projected vehicle's velocity from obstacle proximity sensor data and inclination information.
We describe how this group of behaviours is implemented in the synchronous language Quartz in order to
be formally veried using model checking techniques of the Averest verication framework. Moreover, by
integrating the automatically generated and veried code into the behaviour network, it can be guaranteed that
the robot slows down and stops as required by the given safety specications.
1 INTRODUCTION
More and more applications like unmanned space
travelling, autonomous farming, civil protection, and
humanitarian demining require autonomous vehicles
navigating in unstructured natural terrain. The di-
versity as well as missing information for physical
models of outdoor scenarios call for a exible con-
trol architecture not requiring a complete knowledge
of the environment to achieve robust locomotion. In
this context, behaviour-based control networks have
proven suitable for appropriate reaction on external
inuences.
One of the advantages of behaviour-based ar-
chitectures is emergence: The combination of be-
haviours leads to proper reactions not directly ex-
plainable by the individual components. On the other
hand, this feature also poses problems concerning
predictability, making it difcult to reason about the
correctness of the overall system. However, safety
critical applications require proofs that guarantee that
givenspecicationsare met. Inparticular,the correct-
ness of reactive control layers is mandatory for the -
nal behaviour of the robot.
In circuit design, formal verication has already
become a standard to avoid design errors. Since
all possible input traces of a system are considered
Figure 1: RAVON in rough outdoor terrain.
by formal verication methods, it is guaranteed that
the checked specications hold under all circum-
stances. In particular, different kinds of model check-
ing (Schneider, 2003; Schuele and Schneider, 2006)
are popular verication methods due to the high de-
gree of automation.
In this paper, we consider the formal verica-
tion of a part of the behaviour-based control network
of the mobile outdoor platform RAVON (RobustAutonomous Vehicle for Off-road Navigation, see
Fig. 1), namely RAVON's control system that is re-
sponsible for slowing down and stopping the vehi-
cle. It is clear that this part is highly safety criti-
cal, and therefore, it is very important to guarantee
its correctness. To this end, we have implemented
this partofthebehaviour-basedcontrolnetworkin the
synchronous programming language Quartz (Schnei-
der, 2001b; Schneider, 2006). We then used the for-
mal verication methods of the Averest framework
(Schneider and Schuele, 2005) to check the correct-
ness of our implementation with respect to given
safety conditions.
The application of formal methods to verify the
correctness of a robot system is not new: In (Diethers
et al., 2003), the model checker HyTech was used to
analyse a robot program based on skill primitive nets.
While HyTech considers hybrid automata as system
models to model continuous values of physical prop-
erties, our approach is based on discrete transition
systems that benet directly from symbolic model
checking techniques. The use of symbolic model
checking for the formal verication of a robot sys-
tem has been reported in (Sharygina et al., 2004). In
contrast to our approach, however, the verication is
not integrated with code generation.
The use of synchronous languages (Benveniste
et al., 2003) for the implementation of safety critical
controlsystems ofrobotsis alsonotnew: In(Sowmya
et al., 2002), a controller for a mobile robot (Rug
Warrior) has been implemented in the synchronous
language Esterel (Berry, 1998). In (Kim and Kang,
2005),the core of the Samsung Home Robot SHR100
has been re-engineered to be veried by means of
the Esterel framework. In contrast to our approach,
the systems considered in (Sowmya et al., 2002) and
(Kim and Kang, 2005) were quite small control pro-
grams with only a few control states.
In contrast to the previous work in this area, our
approach considers verication as well as (veried)
code generation. Moreover, the considered system is
not simply a small control program, but a behaviour-
based control network with difcult interdependen-
cies.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In the
next two sections, we give some details on the out-
door robot RAVON and its behaviour-based control
system. In Section 4, we describe the verication
framework Averest and give some basics about syn-
chronous languages and model checking. Section 5
contains the results of the verication. Finally, we
conclude with a summary and directions for future
work.
Figure 2: Regions monitored by the obstacle detection and
avoidance facilities.
2 THE OUTDOOR ROBOT
RAVON
RAVON is a four wheeled off-road vehicle measur-
ing 2.35m in length and 1.4m in width and weight-
ing 400kg. The vehicle features a four wheel drive
with independent motors yielding maximal velocities
of 3m/s. In combination with its off-road tires, the
vehicle can climb slopes of 100% inclination predes-
tining it for the challenges in rough terrain. Front and
rear axis can be steered independentlywhichsupports
agile advanced driving manoeuvres like double Ack-
erman and parallel steering.
In order to navigate in a self-dependent fashion,
RAVON has been equipped with several sensors. For
self localisationpurposes,the robotuses its odometry,
a custom design inertial measurement unit, a mag-
netic eld sensor, and a DGPS receiver. The sensor
data fusion is performed by a Kalman lter (Schmitz
et al., 2006) which calculates an estimated pose in
threedimensions. Duetogravitymeasurementsofthe
inertial measurementunit, the control system receives
quite precise absolute data for the roll and pitch angle
of the vehicle. These are fed into behaviours that are
responsible for supervisingwhether the vehicle might
tip over due to critical inclination.
In order to protect the vehicle in respect to ob-
stacles, several safety regions are observed by dif-
ferent sensor systems (Sch¨ afer and Berns, 2006) (see
Fig. 2). First of all, hindrances can be detected using
the stereo camera system mounted at the front of the
vehicle. The stereo camera's narrow eld of vision
is compensated by local obstacle memories to either
side of the robot realising a short-term representation
of detected obstacles. This obstacle detection facility
is complemented with two laser range nders (eld
of vision: 180 degrees, angular resolution: 0.5 de-
grees, distance resolution: about 0.5cm) monitoring
the environment nearby the vehicle. Data from both
sources of proximity data is used for obstacle avoid-Figure 3: Basic behaviour module.
ance by appropriate behaviours, the fusion of which
is performed inside the behaviour network.In case of
emergency, the system is stopped on collision by the
safety bumpers which are directly connected to the
emergency stop to ensure maximal safety.
3 BEHAVIOUR-BASED
CONTROL SYSTEM OF RAVON
This section introduces the components used for
building up the behaviour-based network controlling
RAVON.
3.1 Behaviour Module
The fundamental unit of the proposed control archi-
tecture is the behaviour module (see Fig. 3). Each
atomic behaviour is wrapped into such a module with
a dened interface. Behaviours can be described as
three-tuples of the form
B = (r;a;F) (1)
where r is the target rating function, a is the activ-
ity function, and F is the transfer function of the be-
haviour. Additionally each behaviour receives an in-
put vector~ e, an activation i, and an inhibition i and
generates an output vector~ u.
More preciselybehavioursreceivedata neededfor
fullling their work via the sensor input~ e2Ân which
can be composed of sensory data or information from
other behaviours. The output vector ~ u 2 Âm trans-
mits data generated by the behaviour. This output
describes the inuence a behaviour can have on the
environment or on other behaviours.
Each behaviour owns an input determining its ac-
tivation i 2 [0;1]. In this notation i = 0 indicates de-
activation and i = 1 a fully activated behaviour. Val-
ues between 0 and 1 refer to a partially activated be-
haviour. Activation can be used to adjust the rele-
vance of competing behaviours. The inverse effect is
achieved by inhibition i 2 [0;1] which is used to re-
duce the activation of a behaviour: i = 1 refers to full
inhibition, i = 0 to no inhibition.
Information about the activity of a behaviour is
provided by the output a 2 [0;1]. The maximal ac-
tivity is described by a = 1, inactivity by a = 0. It is
dened by the activity function
a(~ e;i;i) = aint(~ e)i(1 i) (2)
where aint(~ e) 2[0;1] is an internal functionrepresent-
ing the intended activity of the behaviour.
The target rating r 2 [0;1] deals as an indicator
for the contentment of a behaviour. A value of r = 0
indicates that the behaviour is content with the actual
state, while r = 1 shows maximal dissatisfaction.
The output vector~ u of a behaviour is determined
using its transfer function F(~ e;i;i) where
F : Ân[0;1]2 ! Âm; F(~ e;i;i) =~ u
This functionprovidesthe intelligenceofa behaviour,
calculating actions depending on input values and in-
ternal representations. This can be a reactive respond
to input values but also a more complex calculation
as a state machine or sophisticated algorithms. Both
reactive and deliberative behaviours can be imple-
mented that way.
3.2 Example Behaviour Roll Stop
In this section a behaviour reacting on high roll is de-
scribed in order to exemplifythe behaviourproperties
described before. As the behaviour wants to stop the
vehicle, the output~ u is a velocity of zero. Therefore
the transfer function is:
~ u = vout = 0
This velocity has an effect if the activity a rises:
a = Threshold(roll)i(1 i)
Here Threshold(roll) is a function returning 0 or 1
depending on the roll value being below or above a
given threshold. The activity is scaled by the activa-
tion i and the inhibition i as stated above. Similarly
the target rating r is
r = Threshold(roll)
In case of normal roll angles the behaviour is con-
tent (r = 0) while for high roll angles it is dissatised
(r = 1).
3.3 Fusion Behaviour Module
In case of competing behaviours so called fusion be-
haviours (see gure 4) are used for coordination. The
underlying assumption of the fusion of output values
is that behaviours having a high activity deserve a
higher inuence on the control than those with lowerFigure 4: Fusion behaviour module.
activity. The interface of fusion behaviours imple-
ments a renement of usual behaviours. For each of
thecompetingbehavioursBi theactivity(indicatedby
~ a), target rating (indicated by~ r) and output vector~ u is
provided. The output vector is fed into the fusion be-
haviour as~ e. Additionally there is a fusion of inhibit-
ing behaviours by the inhibition inputs~ i. The transfer
functionthen is the fusion function f(~ a;~ e) which pro-
cesses these input values to a merged output control
vector~ u.
The fusion function can have several implementa-
tions, in this work the weighted fusion is used: Here
the controlvaluesareweightedwith theactivityof the
correspondingbehaviour, leading to a fusion function
fweighted, where
~ u = fweighted(a0;~ u0;:::;an 1;~ un 1) =
n 1
å
j=0
aj ~ uj
n 1
å
k=0
ak
(3)
The activity is set according to the weighted input ac-
tivities, theactivation,andthemaximallyactivatedin-
hibiting behaviour:
a =
n 1
å
j=0
a2
j
n 1
å
k=0
ak
i(1 im) where im = max
l
(il)
The target rating of a fusion behaviour indicates its
goal to satisfy highly activated input behaviours and
is calculated as follows:
r =
n 1
å
j=0
aj rj
n 1
å
k=0
ak
The weighted fusion function provides a subtle
gradation of coordinating behaviour control outputs
regarding their activity.
3.4 Behaviour Network of RAVON
The behaviour network implemented on RAVON is
shown in Fig. 5. Here the ow of control data is
marked as blue drawn through line while data de-
rived from sensors as well as interpreted sensor data
(e.g. the activity output of behaviours used as inhi-
bition input for fusion behaviours) is marked as red
dashed line.
The behaviour network comprises three control
chains affecting desired rotation, sideward motion,
and velocity of the vehicle. The rotational and
the sideward components are inuenced by obstacle
avoidance behaviours. For safety reasons the velocity
is adjusted according to obstacle proximity and criti-
cal vehicle inclination. In this behaviour network the
following types of behaviours are used:
 Emergency Stop: Stop due to laser scanner data,
positiveornegativeobstaclesdetectedbythecam-
era system; independently used for forward and
backward motion.
 Slow Down: Reduce velocity due to obstacle
proximity (laser scanner, positive/negative obsta-
cles); independently used for forward and back-
ward motion.
 Keep Distance Rotational: Turn away from obsta-
cles (laser scanner, positive/negative obstacles);
independently used for both sides of the vehicle.
 Keep Distance Sideward: Accomplish sideward
motion due to obstacles at the side; independently
used for both sides of the vehicle.
 Evasion: Evade obstacles at the front by arbitrat-
ing between the keep distance behaviours.
 Point Access: Accessing a given position.
 Point Access Ranking: Perform ranking manoeu-
vres accounting for kinematic constraints.
 Trace Back: Follow just driven path backwards in
order to escape dead ends.
The advantage of this approach is the emergent
vehicle behaviour leading to unforeseen, but suitable
reactiononseveralexternalinuencesatatime. How-
ever,especiallythemaintenanceofvehicleandperson
safetyrequiresmethodsforguaranteeingfundamental
characteristicsofthevehiclemotione.g.incriticalsit-
uations. Therefore, it is necessary to formally verify
the behaviour network with respect to a given set of
specications.Figure 5: Behaviour network of RAVON.
4 THE AVEREST SYSTEM
In this section, we describe the Averest1 frame-
work (Schneider and Schuele, 2005; Schneider and
Schuele, 2006) that provides tools for verifying
temporal properties of synchronous programs (Ben-
veniste et al., 2003; Halbwachs, 1993) as well as for
compiling these programs to equivalent hardware and
software systems. In particular, many formal veri-
cation techniques, including model checking of tem-
poral properties of nite and innite state systems
are available. In Averest, a system is described us-
ing the Esterellike synchronous programming lan-
guage Quartz (Schneider, 2001a), and specications
can be given in temporal logics such as LTL and CTL
(Schneider, 2003). Currently, Averest consists of the
following tools:
 ruby: a compiler for translating Quartz programs
to nite and innite state transition systems
 beryl: a symbolic model checker for nite and in-
nite state transition systems
 topaz: a code generator to convert transition sys-
tems into hardware and/or software
Figure 6 shows the typical design ow. A given
Quartz program is rst translated to a symbolically
representedtransitionsysteminAverest'sInterchange
Format AIF that is based on XML. The AIF de-
scription can then be used for verication and code
generation. Moreover, there are interfaces to third
party tools, e.g. other model checkers such as SMV
1http://www.averest.org
Figure 6: Averest design ow.
(McMillan, 1992). In the remainder of this section,
we describesome backgroundinformationon Averest
focusing on the verication of behaviour networks.
The basic paradigm of synchronous languages
(Benveniste et al., 2003; Halbwachs, 1993) is the
distinction between micro and macro steps in a pro-
gram. From a programmer's point of view, micro
steps do not take time, whereas macro steps take one
unit of time. Hence, consumptionof time is explicitly
programmed by partitioning the program into macro
steps. This programming model, referred to as per-
fect synchrony (Benveniste et al., 2003; Halbwachs,
1993), together with a deterministic form of concur-
rency allows the compilation of multithreaded syn-
chronous programs to deterministic singlethreaded
code. A distinct feature of synchronous languages is
their detailed formal semantics that is usually given
by means of transition rules in structural operational
semantics. This makes synchronouslanguages attrac-
tive for safetycritical applications where formal ver-
ication is mandatory.After translating a Quartz program to a transi-
tion system, it can be veried using symbolic model
checking techniques. For that purpose, the speci-
cations are given as a set of temporal logic formulas
that describethe desiredpropertiesof the system. The
most frequently used properties are safety and live-
ness properties. Intuitively, a safety property states
that a condition invariantly holds on a given path of
the transition system. Similarly, a liveness property
states that a condition holds at least once on a given
path. As an examplefor a safety property,the formula
AGj states that j holds on all possible computation
paths of the system. An example for a liveness prop-
erty is the formulaEFj, stating that thereexists a path
such that j eventually holds.
A breakthrough in formal verication was
achieved in the early nineties, where it was observed
that nite sets can be efciently representedby means
of binary decision diagrams (BDDs), a canonical nor-
mal form for propositional logic formulas (Bryant,
1986). The development of BDDs was a cornerstone
for symbolic model checking procedures based on x-
pointcomputations(Burchetal.,1990)(seetextbooks
like (Clarke et al., 1999; Schneider, 2003) for more
details). With sophisticated implementations and re-
nements of symbolic model checking,it has become
possibleto verifysystems ofindustrialsize, andtode-
tect errors that can hardly be found using simulation
(Clarke and Wing, 1996).
5 FORMAL VERIFICATION OF
THE BEHAVIOUR NETWORK
In case of RAVON, the most important behaviour
network property is the control of the vehicle ve-
locity due to obstacles or critical inclination. The
behaviours affecting the control in this respect are
marked hatched in Fig. 5. In order to formally verify
this part of the behaviour network, the correspond-
ing behaviours have been implemented in the syn-
chronous language Quartz. In this way, the correct-
nessofeverysinglebehaviourcanbeshownbymeans
of a symbolic model checker. By forming a group of
the mentionedbehaviours,it is evenpossible to verify
specications concerning the overall behaviour of the
complete velocity control part of the behaviour net-
work. Moreover, the Quartz code can be exported to
C code and can be wrapped into a module that re-
places the original (unveried)code. As the output of
the veried module is directly transferred to the vehi-
clemotionactuators,itcanbeguaranteedthatslowing
down and stopping has the intended effect.
The veried and synthesized parts of RAVON's
Figure 7: Structure of the veried part of RAVON's be-
haviour network.
behaviour network are depicted in in Fig. 7. It shows
the following structure: If none of the slow-down and
stop behaviours is active, the velocity given by higher
layers (ci velocity) is piped through the three fusion
behaviours without change to co velocity. As soon as
one of the mentioned behaviours becomes active (in
case the inclination rises above a threshold or the ob-
stacle distancebecomestoolow),theactivebehaviour
uses its activity to inhibit the fusion behaviour which
is above it. At the same time, it proposes a velocity
of zero to the underlying fusion behaviour. This fu-
sion behaviour calculates a weighted sum (using the
inputactivities)oftheinputvelocityvalues. Themore
active a behaviour becomes, the less active the fu-
sion behaviour above is. Therefore, the inuence of
the slow-downbehaviourrises and the velocityoutput
of the underlying fusion behaviour decreases. This
mechanism is implemented on two layers here.
For this behaviour network, we checked eight
specications includingthe ones we list below. In this
context, uppercase words indicate system parameters,
ci indicates controller inputs, co controller outputs,
and si sensor inputs. Numbers are marked as un-
signed integers (0u).
 The output velocity is never higher than the input
velocity:
A G (co_velocity <= ci_velocity);
 In case of no near obstacle and tolerable inclina-
tion, the output velocity equals the input velocity.
Therefore,the vehicle is not slowed down without
a reason:A G ((si_camera_distance
>= MAX_VELOCITY_OBSTACLE_DISTANCE)
& (si_scanner_distance
>= MAX_VELOCITY_OBSTACLE_DISTANCE)
& (si_roll
<= MAX_VELOCITY_INCLINATION)
& (si_pitch
<= MAX_VELOCITY_INCLINATION)
-> co_velocity == ci_velocity);
 If very high inclination or very near obstacles oc-
cur, the output velocity is set to zero, i.e., the ve-
hicle stops:
A G (si_roll >= STOP_INCLINATION
-> co_velocity == 0u);
A G (si_pitch >= STOP_INCLINATION
-> co_velocity == 0u);
A G (si_camera_distance
<= STOP_OBSTACLE_DISTANCE
-> co_velocity == 0u);
A G (si_scanner_distance
<= STOP_OBSTACLE_DISTANCE
-> co_velocity == 0u);
 In case of a rising roll angle, the vehicle slows
down. Similar specicationsholdforthe pitch an-
gle and for near obstacles:
A G (ci_velocity == MAX_VALUE
& si_camera_distance
> MIN_VELOCITY_OBSTACLE_DISTANCE
& si_scanner_distance
> MIN_VELOCITY_OBSTACLE_DISTANCE
& si_pitch
< MIN_VELOCITY_INCLINATION
& si_roll
> MAX_VELOCITY_INCLINATION
& si_roll
< MIN_VELOCITY_INCLINATION
-> co_velocity < MAX_VALUE
& co_velocity > 0u );
In order to avoid vacuous specications, formulas of
the type AG(j ! y) are always complemented with
EFj (not shown here). In this way, it is guaranteed
that the antecedent of the implication is not always
false. All of our specications can be expressed in
the temporal logic CTL. Hence, we can use state-
of-the-art model checking techniques to verify these
properties. Using global model checking, the model
checkers perform a complete traversal of the reach-
able states andtherebycheckwhetherthegivenspeci-
cationshold. Usinglocalmodelchecking,themodel
checkers perform some sort of an induction proof to
avoid a complete state space traversal.
BDD-based symbolic model checkers do usually
not support oating point numbers. Therefore, inte-
gers with a given bitwidth are used for the implemen-
tation in Quartz instead of oating point numbers. In
order to integrate the veried module in the control
system, a conversion from oating point to xpoint
numbers is performed for control and sensor values.
In our case study, global model checking was able
to check the specications up to a sufciently large
bitwidth. We used CadenceSMV as backend of Aver-
est. In the following table, we list experimental re-
sults for some bitwidths. For each bitwidth, we list
the number of reachable states, the runtime that was
necessary to verify the system, and the number of re-
quired BDD nodes for the entire verication of the
eight specications. All experiments were performed
on a PentiumIV with 512 MByte main memory.
Table 1: Experimental results of the verication process.
bits states runtime (s) BDD nodes
3 1024 0.95 453
4 8192 1.59 10012
5 65536 2.54 10063
6 524288 3.87 10521
7 4194204 5.54 15399
8 33554432 8.85 49500
In the process of implementing the behaviour net-
work, the question arose if the fusion behaviours
could implement a maximum fusion function (i.e. the
most active behaviour has full inuence) instead of
the weighted fusion function. By means of formal
verication, it was possible to show that in this case
not all specications were valid. Depending on the
implementation, there was either no slowing down of
the vehicle (but only abrupt stopping) or it was possi-
ble that the velocity output was higher than the veloc-
ity input. Experimentalchanges concerningthe struc-
ture and implementation of the behaviour network
can therefore be performed with immediate feedback
about the correct properties stated in the specica-
tions.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
We presentedanapproachtotheformalvericationof
a behaviour-based control network. Without the need
of testing, it is guaranteed that the specied proper-
ties are valid for all possible input traces. Of course,
it is necessary to verify more parts of the system or
even the complete behaviour-based network. Due to
theenormousnumberofstates, thisinevitablyleadsto
the need of improving the model checking approach.
Therefore,methods like modularmodel checking and
abstraction will have to be analysed in this respect.
The uniformity of the behaviours is seen to be an ad-
vantage in this context that can be exploited by tai-
lored verication and abstraction techniques.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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